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T he Program on Alternative Investments, under the aegis of the Center on Japanese Economy and Business and in 
cooperation with the student-run Japan Business Association of
Columbia Business School, hosted the first seminar of the new 
academic year on September 24, 2003. The event featured Mr. Louis
Forster, the president of Cerberus, Japan, and was moderated by 
Dr. Mark Mason, director of the program. Mr. Forster’s presentation focused on Cerberus’s
acquisition of Aozora Bank and his vision for the bank’s future development. Following are
excerpts from Mr. Forster’s presentation, together with selections from the subsequent 
question-and-answer period.
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Private equity investments are focused
on businesses requiring operational
and financial restructuring. Cerberus
invests in a wide range of industries,
including electronics, automobiles,
medical equipment, consumer prod-
ucts, retail, distribution, financial, real
estate, and software. Cerberus has
several investment cases in the finan-
cial sector. Some of the more notable
ones are Ableco Finance, one of the
largest high-yield loan originators in
the United States. It is wholly owned
by Cerberus. Ableco has transferred
some of its experience and technique
to Aozora’s platform in Japan.
Cerberus has been managing Ableco
since the late 1990s. Their outstanding
balances today total several billion
dollars. 
Cerberus was one of the main credi-
tors of Mercury Finance during its
restructuring. Mercury is one of the
largest independent, sub-prime con-
sumer auto finance companies in 
the United States. Cerberus originally
invested in the company in 1998 
and exited in 2002. I mention the
transaction not so much because it
was a successful investment, which it
was, but mainly because Mr. Edward
Harshfield will be the chairman and
representative director of Aozora
Bank. Cerberus met him during the
Mercury Finance transaction.  
Cerberus also invested in Korea First
Bank, one of South Korea’s top tier
banks. It is ranked seventh in asset
size. Cerberus owns approximately
15 percent of the bank.
Aozora Transaction Overview
Aozora was established in April 1957
as a long-term credit bank in Japan.
It was acquired by the consortium
led by Softbank in September 2000,
following its nationalization in
December 1998. There are various
determining characteristics of the
long-term credit banks, the main one
being that they are eligible to issue
debentures. Aozora is rated Baa2 by
Moody’s in long-term bank deposits
and Baa3 in senior unsecured debt. 
It is rated BBBpi by S&P in long-term
local issuer credit. Aozora has approxi-
mately 1,500 employees and 17 domes-
tic branches. The bank does almost all
of its business in the Tokyo and Osaka
areas. Its balance sheet is approxi-
mately $53.5 billion; loans are $29.6
billion; shareholders’ equity is $4.5
billion; and the capital adequacy ratio
in domestic standards is 13.3 percent
(note: exchange rate is $1=110 yen). 
Cerberus originally expressed interest
in acquiring Aozora Bank in 1999–
2000 during the auction process
arranged by the Japanese govern-
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Cerberus Overview
I am here to speak specifically about
the Aozora Bank transaction. During
my initial comments, I will tell you
the key to how Cerberus won the
contest for the bank and then talk
about two core areas of opportunity
for Aozora moving forward. These
include attacking the excess deposit
problem in Japan and discussing the
future of Japan’s regional banking 
situation, which plays a very large
role in the Japanese financial system,
even though it is less well known to
non-Japanese. 
Cerberus was founded in 1992 by
Stephen A. Feinberg. During the 10
years before he founded Cerberus,
Mr. Feinberg operated as Feinberg
Management. Since 1982 he has
always been involved with distressed
debt, bankrupt corporations, and
other forms of credit investing.
Cerberus’s primary strategies are 
distressed debt, loan origination, 
private equity, and real estate. All of
our work comes out of the distressed
debt area. Cerberus has $11 billion
under management. About $4 billion
of that is targeted toward Asia, $1 bil-
lion of which is invested in Aozora.
Since early 1998, when we opened
our office in Japan, Cerberus has
invested slightly less than $4 billion.
Today, the capital available for the
Japanese market is roughly equiva-
lent to the total investment there to
date. My specific company, Cerberus
Japan, K.K., is a consultant to the
fund management companies, which
companies in turn manage the invest-
ment funds of the Cerberus Group.
We provide active advice and sup-
port to fund management companies
regarding the group’s activities in
Japan, but the decision making is
conducted elsewhere. 
Mr. Robert Fallon poses a question to Mr. Forster.
AOZORA BANK:  
THE CONTEST OVER,
THE FUTURE BEGINS
Louis J. Forster, President,
Cerberus Japan
September 24, 2003
The basic investment thesis is that relative to any other 
bank in Japan, and relative to most banks in Asia, Aozora
has a very clean balance sheet. It has a substantial excess 
capital base.                                                  —Louis Forster
The Japanese Banking System 
and the Close Relationship between
Aozora and Regional Banks 
The commercial banking system in
Japan is composed of city banks and
regional banks. There are also long-
term financial institutions, which
used to include Nippon Credit Bank
(NCB), now Aozora; Long Term
Credit Bank (LTCB), now Shinsei;
and Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ),
which is now part of the Mizuho
Group. In addition, there are trust
banks and a variety of financial insti-
tutions for either consumers or small
businesses, and there is a farmers’
cooperative network. 
Even though there are many fewer
banks in Japan than in the United
States, there is still major over-banking
in Japan. The system was developed
shortly after World War II and, with
the exception of certain consolidation
events that have occurred in the
commercial banking system, the
financial system has remained rela-
tively intact over the last 40 to 50
years. The differentiation of roles
among these different categories of
banks has declined drastically. In
terms of function, it is difficult to tell
many of these institutions apart. 
Other recent changes are the contin-
uous difficulties that the Japanese
financial system is having in reducing
bad debt. In Figure I, which provides
some information on the deposit
base and employee base of the bank-
ing system in Japan, the main point
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ment. This period of time was just 
in the aftermath of Ripplewood’s
leading the acquisition of Long-Term
Credit Bank, now Shinsei Bank. 
The Japanese regulatory authorities
and the Japanese political class were
very straightforward in explaining
that they were not going to sell the
two banks in a row to foreign firms.
After it was clear that Cerberus was
not going to win, Mr. Feinberg enlisted
the help of Dan Quayle, who sits 
on Cerberus’s U.S. advisory board, 
to speak to Masayoshi Son of Soft-
bank to request that Cerberus be
given a small part of the transaction.
Cerberus initially acquired a 5.0 per-
cent stake in Aozora in September
2000 as part of the group led by
Softbank. This was followed up by
Cerberus’s buying the stakes of three
other foreign shareholders who desired
to sell after the original deal was closed.
Going into the final process, which
started last December [2002], Cerberus
owned 12 percent of Aozora Bank.
In early February of this year [2003],
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corpora-
tion made an offer to Softbank at 
73 yen per share, valuing Aozora 
at $1.9 billion and Softbank’s stake 
at $920 million, to acquire its 48.9
percent common shareholding in
Aozora. Suffice it to say that I think
Sumitomo Bank has a great deal
more credibility in Japan than
Cerberus does, and Cerberus became
a very serious underdog at that point.
Sumitomo Bank had the support of
Goldman Sachs as their financial
adviser, as well as the support of the
Japanese regulatory authorities. 
When Cerberus became an investor
during the first go around, one of the
terms of the shareholder agreement
binding Cerberus, Softbank, ORIX,
and Tokyo Fire & Marine was a right
of first refusal. If anyone of these
four firms desired to sell its shares, it
would have to offer them to the rest
of the group first. Thus, Cerberus had
the right to take Sumitomo-Mitsui’s
offer and close it itself. It was a legal,
contractual right. Absent that right we
would never have been able to buy
the shares. In doing business in Japan
it is very important to be respectful
of legal agreements. That Cerberus
had the benefit of this contractual
right of first refusal is a key reason
for its success in buying the shares.
There are many other things that
Cerberus did as well. Cerberus took
the regulatory process and the share-
holder relationships very seriously.
However, I think Cerberus would
have been shoved aside summarily
had it not had the contractual right to
buy the shares. Mr. Feinberg thought
the price was a pretty good one since
it is very rare anywhere in the world
that you can buy a bank at less than
one times clean book. In this case 
it was a little complicated, but on a
fully diluted basis, Cerberus actually
bought the bank at roughly two-thirds
of what was thought to be a fairly
clean book. Cerberus successfully
closed a tender offer on September 5
to acquire 49.8 percent holdings and
became the largest shareholder with
61.9 percent holdings in the bank.
The basic investment thesis is that
relative to any other bank in Japan,
and relative to most banks in Asia,
Aozora has a very clean balance
sheet. It has a substantial excess 
capital base, which will allow us to
either grow the bank without addi-
tional equity infusion or participate 
in some of the consolidation events
that are going on in Japan in the
financial sector. Aozora is also part 
of a rather loosely structured regional
bank network. Ninety-three of the
bank’s shareholders are regional
financial institutions through which
the bank can tap a variety of busi-
ness opportunities under its vision 
to become a “bank for banks.”
The average asset quality of Aozora
Bank during the past year has
improved because the lending poli-
cies of the bank have improved. 
Not only have they gotten past the
put process, but they are starting to
deliver good results in origination.
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I. JAPAN’S FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OVERVIEW
Funds per
Total funds institution Number of Branches per Number of
Category $ billion $ million institutions institution employees
City Banks 2,336 467,223 5 531 102,049
Regional Banks 1,541 24,085 64 119 136,588
Tier II Regional Banks 469 8,850 53 72 58,088
Long-term Credit Banks 43 21,495 2 23 3,611
Trust Banks 321 45,840 7 46 22,664
Shinkin Banks 863 2,648 326 25 127,571
Credit Co-ops 124 647 191 10 24,422
Subtotal 5,697 — 648 — 474,993
Labor Banks 112 5,315 21 33 10,949
Shoko Chukin Bank 97 96,928 1 102 4,691
The Norinchukin Bank 386 385,797 1 41 2,764
Agricultural Co-ops 408 345 1,182 19 263,342
Post Office 1,944 1,944,447 1 24,176 131,602
Subtotal 2,947 — 1,206 — 413,348
Total 8,644 — 1,854 — 888,341
Source: Analysis of Financial Statements of All Banks, The Second Association of Regional Banks, Shinkin
Central Bank, The Shinkumi Federation Bank, The Central Labor Bank, The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries of Japan, JAPANPOST. Note: As of March 2003; data for agricultural co-ops as of March 2002.    
II. COMPARISON WITH UNITED STATES
Funds per
Total funds institution Number of
Category $ billion $ million institutions
U.S. Commercial Banks
National 2,668 1,270 2,101
State Member 1,303 1,373 949
State Non-member 983 200 4,912
U.S. Branches and Agencies
of Foreign Banks 744 2,488 299
Thrift Institutions
OTS Regulated 
Federal Chartered 627 728 861
OTS Regulated 
State Chartered 19 142 134
Other FDIC Insured 
Savings Banks 257 511 503
Credit Unions
Federal Charter 255 42 6,032
State Charter 216 57 3,782
Total 7,072 — 19,573
Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. 
Note: As of December 2002. Total funds: Total deposits and shares + federal
funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase.  
Aozora’s basic business plan
is to provide services to the
regional banking network and
to provide avenues whereby
the regional banking system
can invest its excess deposits.
—Louis Forster
within the Japanese banking sector.
Given the situation, it seemed like
pretty good timing for Cerberus to 
go forward with the purchase of 
the controlling interest in the bank.
Norinchukin Bank is the central bank
for the farmers’ cooperatives. Another
bank is Shinkin Central Bank, which
is a central bank for a class of credit
unions. In these two cases, the banks
operate a very tight “hub and spoke”
system. In the case of Norinchukin,
the local “norin,” or local agricultural
banks, legislatively must upstream
their deposits to Norinchukin Bank.
In the case of the regional banks,
strong relationships, like that with
Aozora, do not exist, and any hub
and spoke system that Aozora 
creates will be voluntary and simply
based on profit-driven motives of 
the regional banks and Aozora Bank. 
Figures III and IV are designed to
explain the excess deposit problem
as well as the lack of a profitable
loan business in Japan. The horizon-
tal line in Figure III shows that the
loan/deposit ratio has declined signif-
icantly in Japan over time. This is
something that will not get better
quickly, primarily because of the
competitive features in the Japanese
financial system. The interest spread
in Figure IV, while not at the lowest
it has ever been, is also weak. Today,
the ratio of net interest income to
total funds is approximately 1.84.
Figure V compares loan spread
between Aozora Bank with the Bank
of Yokohama, which is one of the
very best regional banks in Japan,
and the Bank of New York, which 
is not an aggressive lender in the
United States. Relative to a good
regional bank in Japan, Aozora is 
not generating spread and, relative 
to a conservative lender in the 
United States, Aozora is not making 
a spread. 
Norinchukin Bank has approximately
$500 billion in assets and more than
$100 billion is invested overseas.
What you have to think about 
when given those numbers is that
Norinchukin Bank is the farmers’
cooperative central bank in Japan; 
it gets its money from farmers, and it
is a core constituency of the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP). Yet, it has
managed to get more than 20 percent
of its balance sheet outside of Japan.
It is the only bank that has done this.
It has been successful because it
does not have the same political 
constraints as the big city banks do,
notwithstanding that it is a farmers’
agricultural bank. The regional banks
with $2 trillion in deposits (four times
as big as Norinchukin Bank) have
very little invested overseas, and
Aozora Bank has almost nothing
invested overseas. There is a very 
big opportunity for Cerberus to use
its lending and fund management
experience to help Aozora and 
the regional banking system move
money into better spread business. 
In terms of banking services, every
regional bank has its own servicing
department, its own currency depart-
ment, and its own settlement depart-
ment. There are very few third-party
professional service companies with-
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is the total deposits in the banking
system in Japan ($8.64 trillion). It is 
a relatively large number. If you com-
pare this number with the figure in
Figure II ($7.07 trillion), you can see
that the United States, with an economy
2 1/2 times the size of Japan’s and
with a population less than 2 1/2
times the size, has a smaller amount
of deposits in the banking system. 
Aozora’s basic business plan is to
provide services to the regional
banking network and to provide
avenues whereby the regional 
banking system can invest its excess
deposits. The total deposits in the
regional banking system are well
over $2 trillion. In attacking those
opportunities lying in the regional
banking system, the main competi-
tors are Shinsei Bank and Mizuho
Group. For different reasons, each 
of them is not that well positioned
with the regional banking system
compared to Aozora. Historically, IBJ
has done a tremendous amount of
work with the regional banking 
system, but they are stuck right now
within the Mizuho Group. There is a
very difficult process going on right
now rationalizing the Mizuho Group
into an entity that can make money
going forward. In the case of LTCB,
it really did not have the same histor-
ical relationship with the regional
banking system, and it has taken a
slightly different tact with its business
plan. It is much more focused on
investment banking and trading, and
less focused on relationship building
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The key challenges to Aozora’s business plan are enhancing
management and the business culture, growing high-quality
assets, and improving liquidity.                        —Louis Forster
III. TREND OF LOANS AND DEPOSITS FOR REGIONAL AND TIER II 
REGIONAL BANKS
IV. TREND OF INTEREST SPREAD FOR REGIONAL AND TIER II 
REGIONAL BANKS
V. LOAN SPREAD COMPARISON WITH U.S. BANK
Aozora Bank Bank of Yokohama Bank of NY
Pretax operating income/
Total income 18.8% 10.8% 28.0%
Interest income/Total income 76.7% 76.2% 40.9%
Average loan rate 1.99% 2.11% 3.91%
Average funding rate 0.54% 0.05% 1.24%
Spread 1.45% 2.06% 2.67%
Note: As of March 31, 2003; BoNY as of June 30, 2003. Average loan and funding rate for BoNY; average rate for 
six months ending June 30, 2003. Funds: Aozora Bank and Bank of Yokohama (deposit + debenture + NCD); Bank
of New York (Money market rate accounts + savings + CD + other time deposits + foreign offices).
Source: Japanese Bankers Association, The Second Association of Regional Banks.
Source: Bank of Japan, Japanese Bankers Association, The Second Association of Regional Banks, Bank of Japan.
Dr. Mark Mason
less clear what its role was originally.
I think it has no intention of selling
its shares but will hold onto them
right through an eventual IPO of the
bank. It does have one key manage-
ment position as well as a couple 
of board seats. I do not anticipate
any real change, but I do not think 
it will be active in management the
way ORIX is.
Q: How have you dealt with staffing
and cross-cultural issues? 
Forster: It is an issue in Japan for all
foreign-led restructurings or acquisi-
tions and private equity transactions.
We have been working in Japan for
the last five years. It is not a long
time to be in Japan. When I went to
see the people at Tokyo Marine and
Fire to speak to them about their
intention to hold or sell their shares,
I explained that Cerberus had
obtained the ripe old age of 20 years.
That did not compare with their 
125-year history, but 20 years in the
fund-management business in the
United States is a long time. We staff
locally. Cerberus and the companies
it owned directly and indirectly prior
to the acquisition of Aozora had
about 100 employees in Japan—and 
I am the only foreigner. The other 
99 are Japanese nationals. In the case
of Aozora, with 1,500 employees,
Cerberus will probably send six 
people from outside Japan to work
in key areas of the bank and they
would be primarily systems people
and risk managers. We try not to put
too many Western people into Japan
in these situations. We also spend
lots of time listening and trying to
understand the local issues when
there is a problem. In the case 
of Aozora, that means listening 
really carefully to the regulators.
Depending on the acquisition and
the industry, we listen to the various
constituencies.
Q: Usually American distressed
investors have the image of vulture
funds or villains. When you try to 
do business in Japan, especially with
regional banks, how do you over-
come the image that Cerberus has?
Forster: It is sometimes a problem.
It is very hard to know how much 
of the problem is a media event and
how much of the problem is really a
problem with an individual counter-
party. Cerberus has invested a lot of
money in Japan over the last few
years, and it is difficult to know how
much more could have been invested
if the firm did not have to carry
around the reputation of being a 
vulture fund. I think the severity of
the issue has been declining quite a
bit over the last two years. Compared
to when we first arrived in Japan in
1997–98, there is much more accept-
ance of what our industry does and
how we do it. In Cerberus’s particu-
lar case, one of the group companies
is a financial services business that
has 50 to 60 people. It is entirely 
run by Japanese; they are very well
received and are rated by Fitch. They
have many large Japanese financial
institutions as clients, including one
branch of the Japanese government.
Cerberus encourages these profes-
sionals to lead their own business,
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in the Japanese banking system. 
If you compare this with the United
States, there are all of these Savings
& Loan institutions across the country
that originate mortgage loans, and
none of them service their own
loans. They all use one of the large,
countrywide consumer mortgage
servicing companies, and, even in 
the case of corporate debt, most 
U.S. corporate debt is syndicated or
secured and serviced by professional
third-party services. It is difficult to
know the actual excess cost of this 
to the regional banks, but I think 
it is in the area of 25 basis points,
maybe a little more, and, in the 
context of a decent regional bank
with a 2 percent loan spread, that 
is a very large amount. 
Finally, there are 117 regional banks
but less than 50 prefectures in Japan.
Aozora will have the opportunity to
bid for some of the regional banks
that will be absorbed by other banks
in the Japanese system over the next
few years. There have already been
several. 
Aozora’s Business Plan
The key challenges to Aozora’s busi-
ness plan are enhancing management
and the business culture, growing
high-quality assets, and improving
liquidity. First, enhancing manage-
ment is a very difficult issue in Japan
because it is hard to find experienced
management in Japan. The culture is
very distinct, and importing Western
management into the Japanese system
does not always work very well. 
It is very lucky for Cerberus to have
found Edward Harshfield, who not
only has a great deal of experience
in Asia but also in commercial bank-
ing. He is also a non-bank finance
expert. Second, in terms of growing
high-quality assets, there are going 
to be opportunities to make good
spread loans in Japan, but it is essen-
tial to have a worldwide net for cap-
turing loan business. Third, Aozora is
a long-term credit bank. It is roughly
50 percent funded by debentures 
and 50 percent by deposits. It is very
important that Cerberus, as the new
shareholder, focus on the relationship
with the venture holders so that it
will not, in the event of a general 
liquidity crisis in Japan, suffer a 
liquidity problem at Aozora.
In summary, the main opportunity
comes from the overwhelming
amount of excess liquidity in the
Japanese system. Aozora and
Cerberus must treat the regional
banks fairly, and I think when
Aozora originates a loan, if it is 
putting half of that on its balance
sheet and distributing the rest to third
parties in Japan, that demonstrates
the kind of credibility that some of
the broker-dealers cannot demon-
strate by acting purely as intermedi-
aries. By treating the regional banks
fairly, Aozora and Cerberus should
be able to build a large, mutually
beneficial business with the regional
banking system. I think the future of
the regional bank system in Japan
depends heavily on their rationalizing
their own businesses by (1) buying
services instead of providing every-
thing in-house; (2) merging with
stronger players in the marketplace;
and (3) taking other cost-saving
measures such as closing poorly 
performing branches.
Questions and Answers:
Q: I understand that both Tokyo
Marine and Fire Insurance, and ORIX
remain significant shareholders in
Aozora. What role, if any, will they
play in the future strategy of the
development of the bank?
Forster: ORIX is probably the most
well-known non-bank in Japan and
probably the best-known leasing
company in Japan. It also has several
of the key management positions at
the bank. I think it will continue to
play an important role in the man-
agement and strategy of the bank
moving forward. It is less clear in 
the case of Tokyo Marine and Fire, 
a large insurance company (primarily
fire, property, and casualty). It is also
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Louis Forster
Cerberus has invested a lot of money in Japan over the last few years, and it is
difficult to know how much more could have been invested if the firm did not
have to carry around the reputation of being a vulture fund.    —Louis Forster
or business setting in Japan. When
you introduce a foreign manager 
into a much more orderly process, 
it creates a great deal of tension. 
The middle management at Aozora is
actually pretty good. I think Aozora’s
biggest problem is a lack of direction
over the last three years. I do not
really blame Softbank for this. It is
not its fault that the Internet went 
the way it did after it bought Aozora
Bank. It is hard to say how the bank
would have done had the Internet
continued to profit and progress. 
As it was, Softbank’s key business
platform was removed shortly after 
it bought Aozora, and management 
has been at sea for quite a while
because for two years prior to that
they were under government super-
vision and could not do anything
anyway. I think that Aozora is a 
little different from most of the turn-
arounds we will face in Japan, and 
I think some very strong leadership 
at the top will have a good affect.
Q: What are you going to do with
the other $3 billion in capital you
have designated for Asia? 
Forster: The money management
business is funny in that typically 
you have lots of money when you
do not need it and no money when
you need it. That problem has been
solved by firms like Cerberus and
most of its competitors by locking
money up for a significant period of
time, which dilutes returns on total
capital but, properly managed, main-
tains very healthy returns on invested
capital. It is clearly the solution
Cerberus has followed. Cerberus
thinks that it is the best solution to 
a problem that lies behind your
question: when the firm has lots of
capital and nothing to invest that
properly meets objectives, Cerberus
sits on the cash. At times the firm 
has had much higher capital balances
than one might think is optimal.
Japan has opened up quite a bit over
the last 12 months. It went through 
a very active period of selling in the
distressed area in 1997, 1998, and
1999, and, after the first big infusion
of capital from the government, the
selling stopped. The banks recapital-
ized a little with the government
money and they stopped selling. In
2000–2001, Cerberus sat on a lot of
capital in Asia. At the end of last year
[2002], and the first quarter of this
year, not including one follow-on
investment in Aozora, Cerberus
invested nearly $1 billion. So far this
year the firm has invested well over
$1 billion including Aozora. So it is
very lumpy. When Cerberus sees
opportunities that meet objectives, it
is not afraid to invest huge amounts
of money in individual opportunities.
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especially in situations where there
might be some local conservatism. 
In the case of Aozora Bank, there are
people who do not want to deal with
Cerberus, and they may use reputa-
tion as an excuse—I do not know. 
I think the tendency now is to wel-
come Cerberus and give the firm a
chance rather than exclude the firm
as potential villains.
Q: The Japanese government seems
to be trying to cultivate a private
equity climate in Japan. How do you
see the climate evolving?
Forster: One of the reasons to
invest in a bank is that if the private
equity market evolves rapidly, then
there will be lending opportunities.
We are skeptical of the IRC’s ability
to restructure key segments of the
Japanese economy only because 
we are skeptical as Americans about
any government agency being able to
do anything anywhere. But maybe it
will be successful. I think Ripplewood
is doing a pretty good job right now.
Carlyle just announced a deal that
looks interesting to me. If we are
really starting a new phase, I do not
think that it is a window of opportu-
nity. Another reason for having a
business in Japan is that they have 
a $4 1/2 trillion economy, and there
are not many of those in the world.
It is very difficult for Ripplewood,
Lonestar, Goldman Sachs, or
Cerberus, which have a great deal 
of capital, to operate in the smaller
markets. 
Q: If you are going to try to export
Japanese regional bank capital into
loan/yen outside, have you had dis-
cussions with the regional banks to
see if they actually have an appetite
for this?
Forster: They absolutely do. One of
the biggest problems in Japan is lack
of expertise in exporting that capital.
Currently, all of the investment banks
send their leverage fund and struc-
tured finance people to talk with the
regional banks, and they are selling
them credit securities that are origi-
nated in New York or London, for
example. The regional banks simply
do not have the staff trained to
understand those instruments, not to
mention that they are dealing with a
broker, and I do not mean that in a
derogatory way. I simply mean that
the investment banker is not taking
any risk for that instrument. Not only
does a regional bank not have any
expertise in taking up that security,
but it also is not taking that instru-
ment from someone who is bearing
any of the risk. I do think there is an
appetite there, but Aozora has to act
carefully to satisfy the regional banks’
needs in a locally acceptable way.
Q: Where do asset management and
nontraditional commercial loans fit
into the scheme? Do you put them
onshore or offshore? 
Forster: I think Shinsei has been
reasonably successful placing money
into funds. Norinchukin has a sub-
sidiary that places funds. We do not
have that specific plan for Aozora,
and we are not going to try to put
the regional banks into Cerberus
funds. We want Aozora to understand
how to take credit risk outside of the
borders. To the extent that regional
banks want to take up that credit risk
directly along side Aozora, or indi-
rectly by taking deposits in the bank,
either is fine.
Q: I think middle management is 
one of the key problems in Japan. 
Is replacing middle management 
successful or not?
Forster: The communication styles
between Westerners and Japanese 
are very different. A typical Japanese
bank or company has a ringi system.
It is a system whereby a paper is
prepared regarding an idea or project
and it is passed around from depart-
ment to department, manager to
manager; and they all have to review
it, make comments, and put a stamp
on it. Contrast Cerberus, which is run
top down. It is run top down with
Steve Feinberg making the decisions.
In a Japanese system, the decisions
are made by working groups and
then percolated up to the board. That
is very difficult for most foreigners to
understand. Likewise, many Japanese
fail to understand how the foreigners
are making decisions. 
Another major difference is age. It is
much more important in Japan, and
very fine distinctions in age, of even
one year, are important and can
make a very big difference in a social
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One of the biggest prob-
lems in Japan is lack of
expertise in exporting cap-
ital . . . the regional banks
simply do not have the
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